IRAQ STUDIESImmediately following the US liberation of Baghdad in 2003, Operational Studies began tracking the US military transition into Phase IV Stability & Peacekeeping operations and Security Sector Reform (SSR). Running parallel to the US and coalition efforts were the activities of the various criminal and insurgent groups to include hardcore Saddam loyalists, Fedayeen, foreign fighters, Al Qaeda, and regional Shi’a militia.
The killing of four security contractors in March 2004 marked a definitive upswing in the violence directed towards the stability and reconstruction efforts that required a corresponding US military response. As such, Operational Studies’ personnel were on the ground in Iraq by early 2004 as senior consultants on Department of Defense contracts supervising security and force protection operations.
Contributing to the increase in insurgency and corresponding slow progress with reconstruction, was an obvious lack of language skills, cultural awareness and respect for the Iraqi population by the US military and contractors. While it is often difficult to identify the insurgents from innocent civilians, the heavy handed approach of the US military and armed contractors often alienated the Iraqi people.
While collateral injuries and deaths are often unavoidable in urban counter-insurgency warfare, there was unnecessary disrespect shown to the Iraqis in the form of arrests with little to no evidence of wrongdoing; protracted detention with little to no cause; midnight raids that invaded the privacy of the family unit; putting men in the prone position in the streets in front of their neighbors; and placing boots on their heads – all serious insults to an Arab or Iraqi.
On the highways and streets of Iraq, military escorts and armed contractors routinely engaged Iraq vehicles with gunfire if they came too close to a convoy. This daily wounding and killing of innocent Iraqi drivers, their families, and the destruction of their only means of transportation, pushed otherwise neutral Iraqis to supporting the insurgents and planting IEDs.
While the British troops in the South also caused their share of collateral deaths, injuries and damage, they took a more culturally sensitive approach to counter-insurgency operations and dealing with the Iraqi people. Much of their methodology can be attributed to their experience dealing with the troubles in Northern Ireland.
As such, it is obvious that for stability and reconstruction projects to move forward, and for counter-insurgency operations to be successful, the occupying force must win the support of the people at both the local and national levels. Winning this support must begin with a demonstration of respect for the local custom and culture, and a diligent effort to avoid unnecessary deaths and damage.
Operational Studies is tracking the progress of the counter-insurgency war in Iraq with a professional interest in better models for future stabilization operations. OS is also involved in pre-deployment training as it relates to Arab, Iraqi and Afghan Cultural Sensitivity. Programs include:
For additional information on counter-insurgency in Iraq download the following Acrobat Reader (pdf) files
Changing the Army for Counter-Insurgency 1.2 MB
General Patraeus Observations 2006 2.9 MB